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Abstract
This paper provides preliminary quantitative evidence about the relationship between police
union collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and police accountability, bridging a previously
existing gap in the empirical literature on police union contracts. I conduct linear regression
analysis of a database of 178 police union contracts (coded by discipline-related terms) and a
database of the corresponding police departments’ performance on a wide range of
accountability-related indicators. I find no statistically significant relationships between any
discipline-related contract terms and accountability metrics, nor a significant relationship
between the number of discipline-related contract terms and accountability indicators. Although
this exploratory quantitative analysis is constrained by considerable empirical limitations, it
suggests that more careful research may be needed to determine whether, in the aggregate,
police union contracts are indeed barriers to police accountability.
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Introduction
Since the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, police violence in cities like
Ferguson, Baltimore, and Minneapolis has accelerated a national reckoning over policing in the
United States. 1 Observers across the political spectrum have coalesced around the idea that
police unions and their powerful collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) are partly to blame
for the perceived impunity with which police departments operate. For instance, a political
scientist from the conservative Manhattan Institute recently published an article claiming,
“[c]ollective bargaining agreements with police too often constrain department leadership and tilt
the playing field away from accountability for officers' misconduct.” 2 Meanwhile, the ACLU
claims that such contracts “protect officers with special rights from punishments and
consequences, and block [the] ability to generate holistic public safety systems.” 3 Anecdotal
evidence from police departments across the country seems to validate this hypothesis. 4
Police unionization is widespread in the United States. Even as union power in general
has significantly declined, about seventy-five to eighty percent of American police officers were
members of a labor union in 2017. 5 Police unions are also successful in bargaining for wages,
benefits, and other labor protections. Unionized police officers are paid better than nonunionized officers. In 2013, starting salaries for police officers were about 19 percent higher in
departments with a collective bargaining agreement, compared to those without a CBA. 6
Unionized police officers also enjoy more generous benefits, on average. A 2011 empirical
survey of unions found that pensions for public sector unions—and particularly police unions—
See Mitch Smith, Policing: What Changed (and Didn’t) Since Michael Brown Died, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/us/racism-ferguson.html [https://perma.cc/RM8E-WNSY] (discussing
the legacy of Michael Brown, an unarmed Black teenager shot by police in Ferguson, Missouri, on policing); Justine
Barron, Freddie Gray, Five Years Later, THE APPEAL (Apr. 23, 2020), https://theappeal.org/freddie-gray-five-yearslater/ [https://perma.cc/YRX7-5Q32] (examining a similar legacy of Freddie Gray, an unarmed Black man killed by
police in Baltimore, Maryland); Ram Subramanian & Leily Arzy, State Policing Reforms Since George Floyd’s
Murder, BRENNAN CTR. (May 21, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/state-policingreforms-george-floyds-murder [https://perma.cc/SUH4-75AR] (tracking the impact on police reform efforts of the
murder of George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, by police in Minneapolis, Minnesota).
1

Daniel DiSalvo, Police Reformers' Next Step: A Hard Look at Union Contracts, MANHATTAN INST. (Feb.
2, 2021), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/police-reform-hard-look-at-union-contracts [https://perma.cc/XG5TXFLK].
2

Paige Fernandez & Nicole Zayas Fortier, Protect People, Not Police Lobbyists, ACLU (June 1, 2021),
https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/protect-people-not-police-lobbyists [https://perma.cc/MWB3LX2H].
3

4
See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 Duke L.J. 1191, 1193-98 (2017) (discussing how police
union contracts seemed to have prevented officers who committed particularly egregious acts of violence on
civilians from being held legally accountable in Chicago, Illinois and Baltimore, Maryland).
5
See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Progeny, 101 Geo. L.J. 1023, 1045 (2013) (“Government employees
have fared far better than their counterparts in the private sector, where effective unionization has long been in a
state of free fall.”); RON DELORD & RON YORK, LAW ENFORCEMENT, POLICE UNIONS, AND THE
FUTURE 179 (2017) (estimating police union membership).
6
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICES (2015), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G8J-69CH].
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are more generous than analogous private sector retirement plans. 7 Most importantly, police
unions enable officers to negotiate for “a greater say in internal policy matters,” which almost
always includes disciplinary procedures. 8 Police officers consider say over disciplinary practices
a fundamental privilege because they “often function in hostile environments” and “should have
the ability to exercise their authority with some discretion to achieve public safety goals.” 9
Empirical explorations of the effects of police unionization on police conduct are scarce,
although recent scholarship has found a generally positive relationship between unionization and
misconduct. In 2019, researchers at the University of Chicago Law School compared the
incidence of violent misconduct of unionized and non-unionized law enforcement officers in
Florida between 1996 and 2015. 10 Exploiting a 2003 Florida Supreme Court Decision that
conferred collective bargaining rights on sheriffs’ deputies (but leaving police departments
unaffected), the researchers found that sheriff’s deputies exhibited a 40 percent increase in
violent misconduct relative to municipal police officers. 11
Economist Felipe Goncalves called these results into question, however, finding no
statistically significant increases in officer misconduct among Florida law enforcement officers
after the introduction of unionization. 12 Goncalves found that “the crucial presumption that
[police] unions are able to successfully protect problem officers is not borne out among Florida
misconduct investigations.” 13
Subsequent research has found evidence of relationships between collective bargaining
rights and civilian deaths at the hands of the police in the United States. In a 2021 paper, a team
Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, Josh Hurwitz & and Laura Quinby, Unions and Public Pension
Benefits, CTR. FOR RET. RSCH. AT B.C. 2-5 (2011), https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/slp_19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2NQZ-PVE6] (noting this is true despite the fact that “[p]lans for police and fire employees are
considerably more expensive than those for teachers or general employees, because public safety workers retire at a
much younger age.”).
7

Rushin, supra note 4 at 1205; Tate Fegley, Police Unions and Officer Privileges, 25 INDEP. REV. 165, 169
(2020) (quoting the Florida Police Benevolent Association, the largest police union in Florida: “We give law
enforcement officers a voice in the day-to-day affairs of their agencies and we fight to win them better pay, benefits
and working conditions.”).
8

Jamein Cunningham, Donna Feir & Rob Gillezeau, Overview of Research on Collective Bargaining
Rights and Law Enforcement Officer’s Bills of Rights 5 (Dec. 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/LEOBR_Cunningham_12_3_20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BA4MLVZ].
9

See Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, Collective Bargaining Rights and
Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida (U. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 831,
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095217 [https://perma.cc/2VUN-4JWD].
10

11

Id. at 19.

12
See Felipe Goncalves, Do Police Unions Increase Misconduct? 3 (Mar. 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d9a8d71e5b6c72dc2a90f1/t/60622724b6a902732b636324/1617045285669/
Goncalves_Unions.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZV7-C2NL] (“The evidence suggests that unionization does not lead to
meaningful increases in fatal incidents by police or officer decertifications in either the national or Florida
sample.”).
13

Id. at 31.
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of economists examined variation in the location and timing of when officers were granted
bargaining rights to determine the impact of collective bargaining rights on police killings of
civilians, focusing specially on duty to bargain provisions. 14 The authors find that the
“introduction of collective bargaining rights for law enforcement drives a substantial increase in
non-white civilians killed by law enforcement over both the medium and the long-run,”
suggesting that collective bargaining rights accounted for 10 percent of the total non-white
civilian deaths during the period studied. 15
Such findings comprise an important foundation for empirical analyses of police union
contracts themselves. In a groundbreaking 2017 article, Professor Stephen Rushin of the Loyola
University Chicago School of Law found compelling, albeit qualitative, evidence that police
union CBAs’ inclusion of problematic, discipline-related terms frustrates attempts to hold
officers accountable for misconduct. 16 By collecting and coding a dataset of 178 police union
contracts from the nation’s largest cities, Rushin dramatically advanced the field by analyzing
the relationship between specific contract terms and police misconduct and accountability.
This paper seeks to build on this advancement by adding a quantitative element. It is a
preliminary attempt to answer the question: which specific police union contract terms, if any,
are associated with variations in police misconduct and accountability?

Hypothesis
In a previous iteration of this project, I conducted qualitative, interview-based research
into how police union contracts are drafted and negotiated. Between February and April 2022, I
conducted telephone interviews with ten lawyers involved in drafting and negotiating police
union contracts in major U.S. cities. 17 The lawyers came from a broad cross-section of U.S.

Jamein Cunningham, Donna Feir & Rob Gillezeau, Collective Bargaining Rights, Policing, and Civilian
Deaths, IZA INST. OF LAB. ECON. 2 (Mar. 2021), https://ftp.iza.org/dp14208.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA38-C5V3].
“Duty to bargain” provisions are imposed by state statutes, requiring municipalities to “bargain in good faith with
their employees' representative and to sign any collective bargaining agreement that has been reached.” Bargaining
in Good Faith With Employees' Union Representative (Section 8(d) & 8(a)(5)), NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/aboutnlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/bargaining-in-good-faith-with-employees-unionrepresentative#:~:text=Employers%20have%20a%20legal%20duty,agreement%20that%20has%20been%20reached
. [https://perma.cc/2CGJ-A4B6] (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
14

Cunningham et al., supra note 14, at 29. The authors stated their work is “closely connected” to the work
of Dhammika Dharmapala et al., supra note 10 and Felipe Goncalves, supra note 12, but differentiated their
methodology from that of Goncalves in three key ways: “First, we focus on deaths by race while he focuses on
aggregate deaths, which may mask heterogeneity in police use of lethal force. Second, our research examines a
different treatment: the duty to bargain with law enforcement officers’ unions. The duty to bargain may not only
strengthen the local power of unions that ultimately establish themselves, but it may also have spillover effects on
non-unionized departments within the same state. Finally, we focus on the time period before his begins - one with a
rapid increase in police violence.” Id. at 9.
15

16

Rushin, supra note 4 at 1252.

17
See Appendix B for a discussion of the challenging nature of identifying outside counsel to police unions.
See Appendix C for a list of the law firms and lawyers I was able to identify.
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cities, 18 and espoused a diverse range of beliefs about police unionization, the role of the police
in the communities they serve, and the need for police reform. However, almost all the lawyers I
interviewed emphasized (sometimes unprompted) that police union contracts (1) are unfairly
maligned by police reform activists; (2) do not vary widely between police unions; and (3) are
not materially different from those used by most public sector unions. 19
Although this paper does not test these claims directly, it does test the relationship
between police union contracts and a proxy that captures the spirit of these claims: whether
police unions are effectively held accountable. Building on the literature and my interviews with
police union lawyers (and taking them at their word), I hypothesize that the inclusion of
discipline-related contract terms would not be significantly associated with accountability-related
policing outcomes.

Materials & Methods
My sample is derived from 178 police union contracts from the largest American cities
between 2014 and 2016 gathered by Professor Stephen Rushin for a 2017 article in the Duke Law
Journal. 20 It was first large-scale collection of police union CBAs coded by specific contract
Albuquerque, New Mexico; Austin, Texas; Baltimore, Maryland; Fort Worth, Texas; Jacksonville,
Florida, Las Vegas, Nevada; Memphis, Tennessee; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, San Francisco, California; and San
Jose, California.
18

These observations are largely consistent with two foundational concepts of the empirical contracts
literature. First, contract “stickiness.” In a 2021 paper, law professor Julian Nyarko found that even the most highvalue and high-sophistication commercial contracts, “material” contracts, strikingly lacked dispute settlement
provisions that would have better insulated parties from legal liability. He concluded that parties engaged in a
“distinct apathy toward addressing dispute resolution through contracting” and that “defaults are significantly more
important for transactions between even the most sophisticated commercial actors.” Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and
Incomplete Contracts, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2021). In my research, all of the interviewed lawyers noted that
police union contracts are often based on boilerplate templates that largely do not change year-on-year. I have little
reason to believe that incremental changes to police union contracts are significantly more prone to customization
than high-value commercial contracts, and thus it is reasonable to believe that terms, even discipline-related terms,
are driving variation in accountability-related policing indicators.
19

Second, non-contractualism. In a seminal 1963 paper, law professor Stuart Macaulay found that repeat
parties in mutually beneficial contracting relationships—such as that between police unions and municipalities with
which they bargain—often forego legal formalities (and sometimes, legal counsel), choosing instead to bargain
amongst themselves. Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 1, 7-12 (1963) (finding in a seminal paper that counsel are “called into the dispute settlement process only after
the businessmen settle mattes in their own way” and recalling that one businessman observed “[y]ou can settle any
dispute if you keep the lawyers and accountants out of it.”). In my research, many of the interviewed lawyers stated
that they often took a backseat to union representatives in negotiations with municipalities. Perhaps when
negotiations are conducted informally, contract terms are less prone to influence variation in misconduct indicators.
Rushin, supra note 4 at 1218-19. A note of caution about the timeframe is in order. This dataset includes
contracts in force between 2014 and 2016. To be sure, the political discourse surrounding policing has evolved since
that time. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 811 (2021)
(surveying the “public debate about police policies such as the use of deadly force and police surveillance of Black
and brown people.”). However, I do not think such a time lag is fatal to the analysis in this paper. The majority of
the underlying data in the Police Scorecard metrics (against which I analyzed Rushin’s police union contract dataset)
were collected between 2016 and 2020. It is reasonable to believe that a couple-year lag between the execution of a
20
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provision and covered “approximately 41.4 percent of municipal police officers in states that
permit or require collective bargaining.” 21
Rushin coded the dataset to identify the frequency of disciplinary provisions, eventually
settling on a scheme involving seven “recurring and potentially problematic disciplinary
provisions” that help to limit officer accountability. 22 The coded contract provisions are
replicated in Table 1. 23
Table 1: Rushin’s Potentially Problematic Contract Provisions
Provision
Definition
Delays Interrogations of Officers The contract includes any stipulation that delays officer
Suspected of Misconduct
interviews or interrogations after alleged wrongdoing for a
set length of time (for example, two days or twenty-four
hours).
Provides Access to Evidence
The contract provides officers with access to evidence
Before Interview
before interviews or interrogations about alleged
wrongdoing (for example, complete investigative files or
statements from other witnesses).
Limits Consideration of
The contract mandates the destruction or purging of
Disciplinary History
disciplinary records from personnel files after a set length
of time, or limits the consideration of disciplinary records
in future employment actions.
Limits Length of Investigation
The contract prohibits the interrogation, investigation, or
or Establishes Statute of
punishment of officers on the basis of alleged wrongdoing
Limitations
if too much time has elapsed since its alleged occurrence,
or since the initiation of the investigation.
Limits Anonymous Complaints
The contract prohibits supervisors from interrogating,
investigating, or disciplining officers on the basis of
anonymous civilian complaints.
Limits Civilian Oversight
The contract prohibits civilian groups from acquiring the
authority to investigate, discipline, or terminate officers for
alleged wrongdoing.
Permits or Requires Arbitration
The contract permits or requires arbitration of disputes
related to disciplinary penalties or termination.

specific police union contract and measures of that city’s police department’s effectiveness would be an ideal
timeframe for contract provisions to influence (or not) the indicators.
Rushin, supra note 4, at 1219. See id. at 1219, n. 129 for Rushin’s explanation of the methodology behind
this calculation.
21

22

Id. at 1219.

23
Id. at 1220. See id. at 1224-29 for a discussion of how each term has the potential to limit officer
accountability.
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These 178 contracts comprise my sample. In Table 2 and Figure 1, I report basic
descriptive statistics about the sample. 24
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample
Share of Contracts
Contract Term
Containing Term
Delays Interview
27.9%
Provides Access to Evidence Before
18.4%
Interview
Limits Consideration of Disciplinary
48.6%
History
Limits Length of Investigation or
25.7%
Establishes Statute of Limitations
Limits Anonymous Complaints
17.9%
Limits Civilian Oversight
22.9%
Permits or Requires Arbitration
64.8%
Observations

Number of Contracts
Containing Term
50
33
87
46
32
41
116

177

As you can see from Table 2, my sample only included 177 contracts—one fewer than Rushin’s original
sample. This is because the dataset from Police Scorecard (which supplied the dependent variables in my analysis)
was missing data for one city, Topeka, Kansas.
24

8

Figure 1: Histogram Showing Number of Problematic Terms in Each Contract

I compared this coded sample of contracts against objective measures of police
department performance calculated by Police Scorecard, an independent watchdog
organization. 25 Using data from state and federal databases, public records requests, and media
reports, Police Scorecard compiled a database of hundreds of metrics of policing outcomes for
over 16,000 municipal and county law enforcement agencies. 26 Measured outcomes ranged from
racial disparities in arrests to use of force events per capita to clearance rate, which Police
Scorecard divided into four categories: (1) accountability, (2) approach to policing, (3) funding,
and (4) violence. 27 It then created a composite score of the four categories (each city’s “overall
score”). 28

25
About the Police Scorecard, POLICE SCORECARD, https://policescorecard.org/about
[https://perma.cc/M3Y3-2W8Q] (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.
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Because Rushin’s contract coding scheme examined only discipline-related contract
provisions, 29 I limited my primary analysis of Police Scorecard’s data to metrics related to
accountability. While I do not discount the possibility that discipline-related contract terms may
be associated with police funding or use-of-force outcomes, 30 I believe this limitation is
nonetheless appropriate to maintain like-for-like analysis. Below is a brief methodological
description of Police Scorecard’s accountability-related metrics. 31
Table 3: Police Scorecard’s Methodology for Accountability-Related Metrics
Category
Methodology
Overall
Extent to which investigations into civilian complaints of police misconduct
Accountability
result in a sustained finding of misconduct against the officers involved,
Score
which is usually the first step to imposing disciplinary consequences.

Civilian
Complaints
Sustained
Discrimination
Complaints
Sustained
Excessive Force
Complaints
Sustained
Criminal
Complaints
Sustained

Formula: 0.5*(Percentile Civilian Complaints Sustained) + 0.5*(Percent
Discrimination, Excessive Force, and Criminal Complaints Sustained).
Percentage of founded/substantiated (sustained) complaints compared to all
civilian complaints filed against the agency.
Note: “Overall Accountability Score” uses this metric expressed as a
percentile, as compared to other agencies of similar size jurisdiction.
Percentage of discrimination complaints founded/substantiated (sustained)
compared to all excessive use of force complaints filed against the agency.
Percentage of use of force complaints founded/substantiated (sustained)
compared to all use of force complaints filed against the agency.
Percentage of criminal complaints founded/substantiated (sustained)
compared all criminal complaints filed against the agency.

Using the software package Stata, I conducted inferential statistical analysis using linear
regression to identify whether individual discipline-related contract terms were associated with
accountability-related policing outcomes. Regression analysis is a useful tool for controlling—or
29

See Table 1.

See, e.g., Keith L. Alexander, Steven Rich & Hannah Thacker, The Hidden Billion-Dollar Cost of
Repeated Police Misconduct, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/police-misconduct-repeated-settlements/
[https://perma.cc/RSF9-YDWM] (“More than $1.5 billion has been spent to settle claims of police misconduct
involving thousands of officers repeatedly accused of wrongdoing.”). Many police union contracts contain
provisions that explicitly require municipalities to pay for police misconduct settlements. Contracts Searchable
Database, NIXTHE6, https://nixthe6.org/contracts/ [https://perma.cc/7A8Q-BRHY] (last updated Mar. 2022)
(showing 250 police union contracts containing a clause requiring municipalities to pay for police misconduct
settlements from a searchable database of 836 police union contracts).
30

31
Data Dictionary, POLICE SCORECARD (Jan. 2, 2021), https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KeQHgrSplYzTqzX05byH5fm89f9C_ArSJYHWnkHlSw/edit#heading=h.kk1966kbedef [https://perma.cc/S6HC-EJDK].
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accounting for—the influences of other variables that might also be relevant in accurately
predicting the outcome being observed. 32 My input, or independent, variables are the coded
contract provisions. 33 Note that all input variables are binary, meaning such a provision either
exists in the contract, or it does not. My output, or dependent, variables are the accountability
metrics. 34 All output variables are continuous, meaning they are numeric variables that have an
infinite number of values between any two values. Again, my theoretical hypothesis is that the
inclusion of discipline-related contract terms would not be significantly associated with
accountability-related policing outcomes, controlling for other input variables.

Results
I found no statistically significant associations between specific discipline-related
contract terms and accountability-related policing metrics. In Table 4, I report the linear
regression results between the contract terms and the policing metrics.
Table 4: Linear Regression Model Predicting Overall Accountability
Score 35
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>t
-0.001
0.028
-0.030
0.976
Delays Interview
Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History
Limits Length of Investigation or
Establishes Statute of Limitations
Limits Anonymous Complaints
Limits Civilian Oversight
Permits or Requires Arbitration
Constant
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Observations

-0.010

0.031

-0.340

0.737

0.019

0.023

0.840

0.400

0.002

0.027

0.060

0.950

-0.046
-0.023
0.019
0.282***

0.030
0.027
0.023
0.021

-1.540
-0.870
0.830
13.220

0.125
0.384
0.406
0.000

0.028
-0.013
177
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

32

W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY, THE CRAFT OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 99-100 (5th ed. 2002).

33

See infra Table 1.

34
Overall Accountability Score and the percentage of the following types of complaints sustained
compared to the total number of complaints of that type filed: all types of complaints, discrimination complaints,
excessive force complaints, and criminal complaints.

As a reminder, “Overall Accountability Score” represents the extent to which investigations into civilian
complaints of police misconduct result in a sustained finding of misconduct against the officers involved. It is a
function of the weighted averages of the types of complaints sustained. See infra Table 3.
35
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As is clear from the extremely low R-Squared value, very little (2.8 percent) of the
changes in the Overall Accountability Score can be predicted by the existence of any of the
discipline-related contract terms. 36 That contracts with a provision limiting consideration of
disciplinary provision is associated with a modest, not statistically significant rise (1.9 percent)
in the Overall Accountability Score thus does not tell us much. 37
In Appendix A, I report the linear regression results between the contract terms and the
additional accountability-related policing metrics, none of which had significant associations
with specific contract terms. In fact, I found very few statistically significant associations
between terms and outcomes when I conducted linear regressions for every possible dependent
variable collected by Police Scorecard, across all outcome categories (accountability, approach
to policing, funding, and violence). 38 In Table 5 I report the only statistically significant
associations I found.

The R-squared statistic indicates how much of the variation in the dependent variable of is explained by
the variation in the independent variable. The R-squared statistic varies 0 and 100 percent, where 0 represents that
none of the variation is explained, and 100 represents that all, of the variation is explained. A regression with a
“high” R-squared statistic may be used to claim that the regression fits the data well and explains the observed
variation. Michelle M. Burtis & Darwin V. Neher, Correlation and Regression Analysis in Antitrust Class
Certification, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 531 (2011).
36

The correlation coefficient is a statistical measurement of the linear relationship between two variables;
it varies between positive one and negative one. Id. at 497. In the present context, a value of positive one would
indicate that there exists a perfect positive linear relationship between the existence of a specific contract term and
Overall Accountability Score. The coefficient of the provision that limits consideration of disciplinary history is
0.019, indicating it is all but unrelated to the variation in Overall Accountability Score.
37

Police Scorecard collected hundreds of data points per police department. However, I only conducted
regression analysis on factors for which data was available for at least 60 of the municipalities contained in my
police union contract sample (39 factors).
38
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Table 5: The Only Significant Associations
Between Terms and Policing Outcome Metrics
Civilians
Percentile
Killed /
Percentile
Use of
10,000
Murder
Force
Arrests
Solve Rate

Pop. Adj.
Misconduct
Settlement
Payouts

Delays Interview
0.135*
(-0.062)

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History
-0.492*
(-0.235)

Limits Length of Investigation or
Establishes Statute of Limitations

0.224*
(-0.097)

Limits Anonymous Complaints

-0.168**
(-0.060)

Limits Civilian Oversight

-0.111*
(0.053)

-0.141*
Permits or Requires Arbitration
(-0.056)
Standard Error in Parentheses
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
In one final analysis, I wanted to check whether the number of discipline-related contract
terms could predict accountability-related outcomes. 39 In Figure 2, I present a scatterplot of these
variables. The horizontal axis indicates values for the number of the coded discipline-related
contract terms and the vertical axis indicates values for the Overall Accountability Score. Note
that for display purposes, the points on the scatterplot represent each number of terms’ mean
Overall Accountability Score. However, the r and R-squared value correspond to the original,
177-observation Overall Accountability Scores, rather than the mean scores.

39

Note that “number of terms” was limited to the seven coded categories.
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Figure 2: Mean Overall Accountability Score by Number of Terms

35
31.9
29.4

29.3
26.7

26.7

30
27.7
25

24.3

20
r = -0.037

R-Squared = 0.0013
15
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Mean Overall Accountability Score

40

10

Number of Discpline-Related Terms

As is clear from Figure 2, there is a negative, but extremely weak relationship between
the number of discipline-related terms and Overall Accountability Score. Although it may be
tempting to conclude that because “the line is going down,” accountability goes down as the
number of terms go up, the regression coefficient, r, and R-Squared values are too close to zero
to draw any sort of conclusion from these data. 40

General Discussion
Limitations and Future Research
I found no statistically significant relationships between specific discipline-related terms
in police union contracts and measures of those police department’s performance on
accountability indicators; I found no statistically significant relationship between the number of
such terms and accountability indicators. It is therefore tempting to claim that such results
validate my hypothesis—that the inclusion of discipline-related contract terms would not be
40
See DANIEL MUIJS, DOING QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IN EDUCATION WITH SPSS 163-64
(2d ed. 2011) for a discussion of the derivation and meaning of the regression coefficient and the R-Squared values.
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significantly associated with accountability-related policing outcomes. However, significant
limitations to my research prevent me from making such a claim.
First, the time lag between the Rushin dataset (containing contracts in force between
2014 and 2016) and the Police Scorecard dataset (containing indicators collected between 2016
and 2020) may not be as trivial as I suggested above. 41 It is possible that I was not comparing
like-for-like independent and dependent variables in my analysis. Second, I relied too heavily on
a coding scheme devised by someone else. In our correspondence, Professor Rushin encouraged
me to code the contracts myself to produce more reliable results. 42 Due to time constraints, I did
not heed his advice, which could have partly compromised the accuracy of my results. Third, my
sample was too limited. As Rushin himself identifies, this coding scheme “does not capture all
potentially problematic provisions in police union contracts,” but only those related to police
accountability. 43
To address each of these limitations, I would like to replicate Rushin’s coding scheme
from scratch, using an even larger—and more current—dataset and a wider set of contract terms
that may be linked to non-accountability variables in Police Scorecard’s dataset. 44 Such terms
could include—but are not limited to—whether the contract restricts layoffs, requires the city to
pay for misconduct, requires overtime and hourly minimums for court appearances, and
stipulates procedures for body-worn cameras. One last limitation is the sophistication of my
quantitative analysis. In future, I would like to work with a researcher with a wider quantitative
skillset to measure and report relationships between variables that go beyond simple linear
regressions.

Contribution
This is a preliminary attempt to answer the question: which specific police union contract
terms, if any, are associated with variations in police misconduct and accountability? It is, in
effect, a quantitative extension of Stephen Rushin’s impressive qualitative assessment of the
police union contract landscape. 45

41

See supra note 20.

Email from Stephen Rushin, Professor of Law, Loy. U. Chi. Sch. L., to Jacob Bell (Jan. 19, 2022) (on file
with author) (“[C]ontractual language can be tricky, and coding decisions are highly dependent on the variable
definitions, procedural choices, coders, etc. So I’d strongly recommend that you pick whatever contracts you are
interested in and analyze them yourself rather than relying on any one organization or individual interpretation. This
will produce more reliable results.”).
42

43

Rushin, supra note 4, at 1221.

Nix the 6, a project by the police watchdog organization Campaign Zero, has large database of 836 police
union contracts as of April 26, 2022. See NIXTHE6, supra note 30.
44

45

Rushin, supra note 4.
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Practical Implications
This paper’s (admittedly constrained) findings of no significant relationships between the
number and types of police union CBA terms and accountability outcomes may frustrate
critiques of modern policing that focus heavily on police union contracts. 46 Such critiques may
be overly-simplistic or perhaps fruitlessly searching for a magic bullet to stem the tide of police
excesses. This is important, because as the backlash to the “Defund the Police” movement has
illustrated, advocates for police reform are often at-odds with public opinion. 47 Police unions are
composed of police officers who are often viewed as trusted protectors of their communities. 48
Perhaps advocates for reform should consider whether there is lower-hanging—and more
palatable—fruit than police union contracts.

46

See, e.g., the critiques of police union contracts referenced supra notes 2, 3.

47
See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, Even Democrats Are Now Admitting ‘Defund the Police’ Was a Massive
Mistake, CNN (Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/05/politics/defund-the-police-democrats/index.html
[https://perma.cc/95FG-BP5C] (discussing how Democrats, who largely supported initial calls to “Defund the
Police” in the fallout of the death of George Floyd, came to view the slogan as an electoral liability and a barrier to
meaningful police reform).
48
See, e.g., Americans’ Trust in Law Enforcement, Desire to Protect Law and Order on the Rise, IPSOS
(Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/americans-trust-law-enforcement-desire-protect-law-and-order-rise
[https://perma.cc/Q7L8-43KE] (“Sixty-nine percent of Americans trust local police and law enforcement to promote
justice and equal treatment for people of all races (up from 56%), and 52% feel the same about police unions (up
from 40%).”). To be sure, Black Americans’ trust in police has historically run well-below that of white Americans.
However, polling from Gallup indicates that Black Americans’ trust in police recovered in 2021 from an all-time
low in 2020. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Black Confidence in Police Recovers From 2020 Low, GALLUP (July 14,
2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/352304/black-confidence-police-recovers-2020-low.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9X59-QMYN].
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Appendix A: Additional Linear Regression Results
Table 6: Linear Regression Model Predicting Percentage of All Complaints Sustained 49
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>t
Delays Interview
-0.023
0.040
-0.570
0.567
Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
0.026
0.045
0.590
0.560
Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History
0.023
0.033
0.690
0.490
Limits Length of Investigation or
Establishes Statute of Limitations
0.005
0.040
0.130
0.893
Limits Anonymous Complaints
-0.046
0.045
-1.020
0.308
Limits Civilian Oversight
-0.044
0.037
-1.200
0.231
Permits or Requires Arbitration
-0.010
0.031
-0.310
0.754
Constant
0.190
0.028
6.670
0.000
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Observations

0.028
-0.026
134
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 7: Linear Regression Model Predicting Percentile of Agency
With Respect to Percent of All Complaint Types Sustained
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
Delays Interview
0.007
0.066
0.110
Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
-0.014
0.074
-0.200
Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History
0.027
0.054
0.500
Limits Length of Investigation or
Establishes Statute of Limitations
0.012
0.066
0.180
Limits Anonymous Complaints
-0.134
0.074
-1.820
Limits Civilian Oversight
-0.040
0.060
-0.660
Permits or Requires Arbitration
0.056
0.052
1.080
Constant
0.476
0.047
10.160
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Observations

P>t
0.913
0.845
0.617
0.857
0.072
0.509
0.284
0.000

0.039
-0.015
134
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

49
As Police Scorecard notes, this metric could reflect selection bias regarding who is filing complaints and
the level of difficulty of each department’s complaint filing system. Police Scorecard, supra note 25, at 23.
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Table 8: Linear Regression Model Predicting Percentage
of Use of Force Complaints Sustained
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
Delays Interview
0.016
0.043
0.370
Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
-0.018
0.054
-0.340
Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History
0.040
0.033
1.190
Limits Length of Investigation or
Establishes Statute of Limitations
-0.004
0.043
-0.100
Limits Anonymous Complaints
-0.016
0.050
-0.330
Limits Civilian Oversight
-0.032
0.039
-0.820
Permits or Requires Arbitration
-0.063
0.033
-1.900
Constant
0.109
0.031
3.530
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Observations

P>t
0.711
0.737
0.235
0.921
0.741
0.412
0.061
0.001

0.064
-0.01
99
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 9: Linear Regression Model Predicting
Percentage of Discrimination Complaints Sustained
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
Delays Interview
0.009
0.013
0.720
Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
-0.010
0.017
-0.620
Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History
-0.006
0.010
-0.620
Limits Length of Investigation or
Establishes Statute of Limitations
0.015
0.013
1.140
Limits Anonymous Complaints
0.002
0.015
0.150
Limits Civilian Oversight
0.005
0.011
0.490
Permits or Requires Arbitration
0.001
0.009
0.090
Constant
0.013
0.009
1.560
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Observations

0.041
-0.033
98
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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P>t
0.472
0.538
0.535
0.256
0.878
0.626
0.927
0.122

Table 10: Linear Regression Model Predicting Percentage of Criminal Complaints
Sustained
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>t
-0.027
0.149
-0.180
0.854
Delays Interview
Provides Access to Evidence
0.068
0.212
0.320
0.748
Before Interview
Limits Consideration of
0.153
0.100
1.540
0.129
Disciplinary History
Limits Length of Investigation or
-0.130
0.141
-0.920
0.361
Establishes Statute of Limitations
-0.058
0.177
-0.330
0.743
Limits Anonymous Complaints
-0.100
0.122
-0.810
0.419
Limits Civilian Oversight
0.102
0.093
1.100
0.278
Permits or Requires Arbitration
0.124
0.084
1.480
0.143
Constant
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Observations

0.09
-0.024
64
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Appendix B: Lawyer Interview Methodology
I started by identifying the lawyers involved in drafting and negotiating police union
contracts with the fifty largest cities in the country. 50 I was aided immensely by Check the
Police, an activist organization that compiled police union contracts for the largest U.S. cities
through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. 51 Even so, finding the lawyers themselves
proved more difficult than I anticipated. 52

Some police departments in large cities such as Atlanta, Georgia and Charlotte, North Carolina do not
have contracts with their police departments because of statewide prohibitions on collective bargaining—for any
type of union. Rushin, supra note 4, at 1204 n.58. South Carolina and Virginia also prohibit collective bargaining.
Id.
50

Police Contracts Database, Check the Police, https://www.checkthepolice.org/database
[https://perma.cc/4ZHF-N8NQ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
51

I considered using the “snowball method” of interviewee selection, in which one conducts interviews
with a small cohort of subjects and asks each to suggest others who might be willing to participate, and so on. I
decided against this method to attempt to control for selection bias. One could foresee a situation in which lawyers
referred me to colleagues either (1) in a similar area, subject to the same statutory and market-based constraints or
(2) with unrepresentatively similar approaches to or views about police contracts.
52
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Only about ten percent of the contracts specifically referenced the name of the police
union’s lawyer or lawyers. Next, I tried simple Google searches using variations on the search
string (“Name of Union” AND attorney) to find news coverage about labor negotiations between
the city and the police union. This method was ultimately ineffective because most search results
showed media coverage of instances of criminal defense attorneys representing individual police
officers in misconduct and related matters. Indeed, many (if not most) large police unions retain
separate counsel for employment and criminal defense matters.
Next, I used Lexis Courtlink to find cases in which the police union was the plaintiff and,
separately, when the city was the defendant. 53 I filtered the results by using the opposing party as
a keyword search. This method was the most successful. By selecting cases regarding
employment, I was able to find the names of the majority of the fifty police unions on my list.
For the half-dozen remaining police unions, I used Bloomberg Law’s Labor Arbitration Award
tracker, for which I was about to find cases referencing the police unions’ lawyers. 54 Of the
largest fifty cities with police union contracts, was unable to find lawyers who drafted or
negotiated contracts with the cities of El Paso, Texas and Tucson, Arizona. 55
Thankfully, I was able to find the contact information for most lawyers from a
combination of law firm websites and the court and arbitration documents described above.
However, a handful of lawyers had no law firm websites or websites without listed contact
information (!), so I had to scrub Lexis Courtlink for other cases in which those lawyers were
involved to find phone numbers. I was unable to find contact numbers for three lawyers, even
though state bar records indicated their attorney licenses were still active.
I do not contend that the relationship between police unions and their lawyers are
purposefully opaque, nor opaquer than the traditional client-lawyer relationship. However, I was
surprised that I needed to consult as many different (and expensive, to the non-institutionaffiliated researcher) tools as I did to simply find the names of lawyers representing a quasipublic sector organization. Prior scholarship has bemoaned the dearth of empirical study of
police union contracts. 56 The difficulty of completing this first, most basic research step tracks
with this observation.

53
LexisNexis CourtLink, http://www.lexisnexis.com/Courtlink/online/ [https://perma.cc/CQN9-59EG] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2022).

Bloomberg Law Employment Arbitration Decisions,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/labor/search/results/ca137ea024076f0cca2e6881fd0ef692
[https://perma.cc/4Q8X-GLJE] (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
54

I was unable to find the lawyers who represented the unions of a handful of other cities’ police
departments.
55

See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 4, at 1198 (“[V]irtually no comprehensive empirical work has examined the
prevalence of such provisions in police union contracts across the country.”).
56
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Having found the contact information for about forty lawyers who have represented
police unions in collective bargaining agreements with large U.S. cities, I emailed each with a
request to interview. Ten lawyers agreed to speak with me.

Appendix C: List of Police Unions’ Outside Counsel
Pop.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Table 11: List of Police Unions’ Outside Counsel in 50 Largest U.S. Cities
City
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Houston
Phoenix
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
San Antonio
San Diego
Dallas
San Jose
Austin
Jacksonville
Fort Worth
Columbus

15
16
17
18
19
20

Indianapolis
Charlotte
San Francisco
Seattle
Denver
Washington

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Nashville
Oklahoma City
El Paso
Boston
Portland
Las Vegas
Detroit
Memphis

29
30

Louisville
Baltimore

Police Union’s Law Firm

Lawyer

The Quinn Law Firm PLLC
Andrew Quinn
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, PC
Richard Levine
Asher, Gittler & D'Alba
Joel D'Alba
Hunton Andrews Kurth
Kelly Sandill
Napier, Abdo, Coury & Baillie
James Abdo
Jennings Sigmond
Stephen Holroyd
Willig, Williams & Davidson
Richard Poulson
Ronald G. DeLord PLLC
Ron DeLord
BOBBITT PINCKARD & FIELD
Richard Pinckard
Lyon, Gorsky & Gilbert, L.L.P.
Bob Gorsky
Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP
Gregg Adam
Deats Durst & Owen, P.L.L.C.
B. Craig Deats
Delegal Poindexter
Tad Delegal
Lyster & Associates, PPLC
Chris Lyster
Hunter, Carnahan, Shoub, Byard &
Russell Carnahan
Harshman
Ruckelshaus Kautzman Blackwell
Leo Blackwell
No Contract. State Prohibition on Collective Bargaining.
Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP
Gregg Adam
Vick, Julius, McClure, P.S.
Hillary H McClure
Olson Law Firm, LLC
Sean T. Olson
McGillivary Steele Elkin LLP
Gregory
McGillivary
Feeney & Murray
Lee Anne Murray
Puhl & Wood
Scott Wood
UNABLE TO FIND
Decker & Rubin, P.C.
Bryan Decker
Public Safety Labor Group
Anil Karia
Sgro & Roger
David Roger
Peter P. Sudnick, P.C.
Peter Sudnick
Godwin, Morris, Laurenzi & Bloomfield,
Deborah Godwin
P.C.
Priddy, Cutler, Naake & Meade, PLLC
David Leightty
Schlachman, Belsky, Weiner & Davey,
Michael Davey
P.A.
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31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Milwaukee
Albuquerque
Tucson
Fresno
Sacramento
Kansas City
Mesa
Atlanta
Omaha
Colorado
Springs
Raleigh
Long Beach
Virginia Beach
Miami
Oakland

46
47
48
49
50

Minneapolis
Tulsa
Bakersfield
Wichita
Arlington

Cermele & Matthews, S.C.
Brendan Matthews
Sanchez, Mowrer & Desiderio P.C.
Frederick Mowrer
UNABLE TO FIND
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, PC
Rockne A. Lucia Jr.
Mastagni Holstedt, P.C.
David P. Mastagni
McCauley & Roach, LLC
Sean P. McCauley
Napier, Abdo, Coury & Baillie
James Abdo
No Contract. State Prohibition on Collective Bargaining.
Baird Holm, L.L.P.
Chris Hedican
UNABLE TO FIND
No Contract. State Prohibition on Collective Bargaining.
Law Offices of James E. Trott
James E. Trott
No Contract. State Prohibition on Collective Bargaining.
Slesnick & Casey LLP
Don Slesnick
Berry Wilkinson Law Group
Alison Berry
Wilkinson
Rice Michels & Walther
James Michels
Douglas D. Vernier Attorney at Law, P.C.
Douglas D. Vernier
Hayes, Ortega & Sanchez, LLP
Dennis J. Hayes
Steve A.J. Bukaty, Chartered
Steve A.J. Bukaty
UNABLE TO FIND
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